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ABSTRACT

Introduction: Established in 1994, Pakistan’s polio program demonstrated early success. However,
despite over 120 supplementary immunization activities in the last decade, polio eradication efforts
in Pakistan have been unable to achieve their objective of halting polio transmission. Variable govern
ance, and inconsistent leadership and accountability have hindered the success of the polio program
and the quality of the campaigns. Insecurity and terrorism has interrupted polio activities, and com
munity fears and misbeliefs about polio vaccinations continue to persist.
Areas covered: The article consists of a systematic review of the barriers and facilitators associated with
the delivery of polio eradication activities in Pakistan. We also provide a comprehensive review of the
policy and programmatic decisions made by the Pakistan Polio Programme since 1994. Searches were
conducted on Embase and Medline databases and 25 gray literature sources.
Expert opinion: Polio eradication efforts must be integrated with other preventive health services,
particularly immunization services. Addressing the underlying causes of polio refusals including under
development and social exclusion will help counteract resistance to polio vaccination. Achieving polio
eradication will require building health systems that provide comprehensive community-centered care,
and improving governance and systems of accountability.

1. Introduction
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) was launched in
1988, with the goal of eradication and containment of all wild,
vaccine-related and Sabin polioviruses worldwide [1]. Polio
eradication efforts began in Pakistan in 1994, through the
launch of the Pakistan Polio Eradication Programme [2]. The
Pakistan Polio Eradication Programme is a public–private part
nership led by the federal government, and supported by GPEI
partners including WHO, UNICEF, BMFG, and CDC [3]. Despite
national efforts to eradicate polio, the transmission of wild
poliovirus is ongoing in Pakistan [4].
Presently, Pakistan and Afghanistan are the only coun
tries where the transmission of endemic wild poliovirus has
never stopped [5]. Given global interest in eradicating
polio, polio eradication initiatives have been funded
through a diverse range of donors made up of national
governments, private organizations/non-governmental
donors, and multisectoral partnerships. Since 1985, more
than US$ 17 billion has been donated to support the GPEI.
Between 1985 and 2019, the Government of Pakistan con
tributed roughly US$387 million and US$121 million to the
GPEI through loans provided by the Islamic Development
Bank and Japan International Cooperation Agency, respec
tively, and roughly US$ 58 million through assistance from
other national governments [6].
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Roughly 20,000 wild poliovirus cases were reported in
Pakistan in the early 1990s, however the polio program has
reduced this by up to 99% [2]. Today, Pakistan continues
to be affected by wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) and circu
lating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 (cVDPV2) [7].
A record low of eight cases was reported in 2017; however,
this was followed by an increase in subsequent years, with
12 cases in 2018, 147 cases in 2019, and 84 cases in 2020
(Figure 1). Polio transmission is highly active in certain core
reservoir districts, including Karachi, Peshawar, and the
Quetta block. Polio cases have also been identified in
northern Sindh and Southern Punjab [4,8]. A large propor
tion of cases are among Pashto-speaking populations [9].
The polio program’s success is highly dependent on vacci
nating high-risk mobile populations (HRMP) and internally
displaced persons (IDP), who often have inconsistent
access to the health system [10]. The polio program imple
ments numerous vaccination campaigns every year
wherein roughly 260,000 health workers go door-to–door
to ensure every child under five years of age is vaccinated
against polio [2]. During vaccination campaigns, special
attention is given to the core reservoir districts [4].
Despite efforts by the Pakistani polio program, vaccina
tion bans, rumors, and conspiracy theories that polio eradi
cation is enabling foreign bodies to destabilize the country
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polio program were redirected in the fight against COVID-19,
highlighting the strength of the program’s infrastructure
[18,19]. This strategy has unintentionally increased the sus
ceptibility of already vulnerable children to vaccinepreventable diseases (VPD) such as polio [18]. Although the
government’s response to COVID-19 has been lauded, it begs
the question why has polio not had received the same
political commitment [19].
Understanding the barriers and facilitators to service delivery,
and the operational factors that influence functioning of the
polio program is essential to its success. This systematic review
will present the following: i) a timeline highlighting distinct
polio–related policies, programs, and activities implemented in
Pakistan since 1994, and ii) barriers and facilitators associated
with the delivery of polio eradication activities in Pakistan.

Article highlights
●
●
●
●
●
●

●

Polio eradication requires the intervention of multiple stakeholders at
different levels of the health system
Variable governance and inconsistent leadership have compromised
the functioning of polio eradication activities
The morale of polio workers is low due to inconsistent pay, limited
opportunities for promotion, and consistent threats of insecurity
Improved field monitoring during polio campaigns and through polio
surveillance systems are needed
Misbeliefs and misperceptions about polio vaccination among com
munity members continue to persist
Integration of polio activities with other preventive health services
especially child health, nutrition and routine immunizations may
address community resistance and increase program reach
Terrorism and insecurity are still a consistent concern for the polio
program through blocking access to certain geographies and result
ing in attacks on polio workers

2. Methods

continue to be a barrier to polio eradication [11–13]. Access
to children in security-compromised areas, and attacks on
healthcare workers have created an insecure environment
where the safety of both the providers and recipients has
been jeopardized [14]. In addition to these demand-related
issues, governance and operational failures continue to per
sist as a barrier to polio vaccination [15,16].
The emergence of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID19) has posed a new threat to polio eradication efforts [17].
In April 2020, polio vaccination campaigns and routine
immunization programs across Pakistan were halted to miti
gate the spread of COVID-19. Staff and resources from the

2.1. Search strategy
A systematic search of indexed peer-reviewed literature pub
lished between 1 January 2000 to 30 July 2020 was conducted
in Embase and Medline databases using the OVID platform.
We used the PICO methodology to develop a search strategy
containing relevant key words and medical subject headings
MeSH. Where possible, our search strategy utilized the
‘explode’ function for MeSH terms. We also hand-searched
reference lists of studies included in full-text screening for
any additional studies. The complete search strategy is pre
sented in Appendix I.

Poliovirus Case Count in Pakistan: 1994 – 2020
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Figure 1. Poliovirus case count in Pakistan: 1994 – 2020 [20–24,118].
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For the gray literature search, we searched the websites of
25 stakeholders which are involved in delivering polio eradica
tion or public health activities across Pakistan, including gov
ernmental agencies, national organizations, and international
organizations. These websites included the Ministry of
National Health Services, Regulations, and Coordination, the
health departments of each province and territory, Asian
Development Bank, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Centers
for Disease Control, GAVI, Global Polio Eradication Initiative,
Japan International Cooperation Agency, Pakistan Health
Knowledge Hub, Pakistan Polio Eradication Programme,
Relief Web, United Nations UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNICEF
Innocenti, World Health Organization (WHO EMRO, WHO Iris,
WHO Pakistan), and World Bank (Open Knowledge Repository,
Projects Database). When searching each website, we used
search terms which captured polio, immunization, and general
health programs and policies in Pakistan. Grey literature docu
ments published from 2000 onwards were reviewed.

2.2. Eligibility criteria
Eligible peer-reviewed studies included those reporting pri
mary data on polio eradication activities in Pakistan. The pub
lication must have been available in English, and must have
described barriers and facilitators related to polio eradication.

Figure 2. Prisma.
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Exclusion criteria included editorials, commentary pieces, opi
nion pieces, serological studies, systematic reviews, guidelines,
and non-English publications.
Eligible gray literature documents included any policy or
program-related proposal, evaluation, or report, which
reported on polio eradication activities in Pakistan. Grey litera
ture documents were included if they reported on: i) barriers
or facilitators related to polio eradication activities, or ii) any
polio-related policies, programs, political events, partnerships,
religious advocacy events, milestones, or external events
which impacted polio eradication efforts.

2.3. Data extraction and analysis
Peer-reviewed studies were managed on Covidence, an online
software used to streamline the systematic review process.
Records identified from both databases were imported into
Covidence for screening, and duplicates were removed. Titles
and abstracts were screened in duplicate, full–text screening
was done by a single reviewer, and data extraction was done
in duplicate, followed by data matching. A single reviewer
downloaded, screened and extracted every gray literature
document (see Figure 2). A total of 32 articles from the peer
reviewed literature [25–56] and 13 from the gray literature
[57–69] were included.
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Figure 3. Overview of polio policies and programs in Pakistan.

Barriers and facilitators were extracted from the peerreviewed and gray literature in Microsoft Excel. Key data
extracted included study design, study characteristics, type
of data, and barriers and facilitators which had an impact on
polio eradication activities. The data were then imported in to
NVivo 12, a qualitative data analysis software, and a thematic
analysis of the barriers and facilitators was conducted through
an inductive process. Barriers and facilitators were categorized
in to reviewer-generated codes, followed by broader cate
gories, and ultimately broad themes.
Polio-related policies, programs, and activities were
extracted from the gray literature using a separate extraction
form in Microsoft Excel. Key data extracted included activity

name and description, impact, implementation level, and sta
keholders involved. The extracted data was used to form
a timeline of events, as depicted in Figure 3.

3. Results
3.1. Policy & program overview
Since 1994, a variety of programs and policies have been
implemented as part of polio eradication efforts (Figure 3). In
this section, we will provide an overview of the polio–related
policy and programmatic decisions organized by major polio
project timelines (Table 1).
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Table 1. Polio program and policy analysis table.
Policies/Programs/Strategies/Plans
GLOBAL
GPEI Emergency
Description
Action Plan
2012–2013
(2011)
National Stop
Transmission of
Polio (N-STOP)
programme
(2012)
Islamic Advisory
Group Adopts
Anti-Polio Plan
(2015)

NATIONAL
Pakistan Polio
Eradication
Programme
(1994)
Trivalent OPV
(1994–2016)
Acute Flaccid
Paralysis (AFP)
surveillance
begins (1995)
AFP surveillance
becomes fully
functional (1998)
Synchronization of
Pakistan and
Afghanistan SIAs
(1998)
Stop Transmission
of Polio (STOP)
program (1999)
House-to–house
vaccination
strategy
implemented
(1998–1999)
First ‘Partnership
for Polio
Eradication’
project
(2003–2006)

First National EPI
policy (2005)

Monovalent OPV
(2005–2010)

The GPEI developed the GPEI Emergency Action Plan 2012–2013 for Nigeria, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The goal of this
plan was to help get the GPEI back on track in the endemic regions through an emergency approach. The plan builds
upon the strategies highlighted in the GPEI Strategic Plan 2012-2012, and was focused on developing appropriate
leadership, oversight, accountability and surge capacity at global, national and sub-national level to support
a transformational change.
Classification Global initiative
Description Piloted in Nigeria, N-STOP is a CDC-WHO collaborative program which supports eradication efforts in polio priority
countries, by strengthening local surveillance, training local health professionals, and deploying public health
professionals accordingly. The National Stop Transmission of Polio (N-STOP) program was established in Pakistan in 2012;
16 public health professionals were deployed as part of Pakistan’s N-STOP program.
Classification Global initiative
Description The Islamic Advisory Group for Polio Eradication (IAG) adopted a new action plan that sought to help eradicate polio in the
remaining Muslim nations. The meeting was hosted by Al Azhar in Cairo and was attended by Islamic scholars and
experts of the IAG. Specific to Pakistan, the IAG aimed to enhance the work of the National Islamic Advisory Group for
Polio Eradication in Pakistan, through increased advocacy and communication activities, and also planned to organize for
members of the IAG to visit and interact with religious institutions in priority areas of Pakistan.
Classification Global initiative
Description

The Pakistan Polio Eradication Program, a public–private partnership between the Government of Pakistan and partners
from the GPEI (WHO, UNICEF, BMGF, Rotary International, and CDC), was launched in 1994. The initiation of polio
eradication efforts was signified by the first set of supplementary immunization activities (SIAs) through National
Immunization Days (NIDs).
Classification National programmatic action
Description Trivalent OPV (tOPV) was the only vaccine used in SIAs between 1994-2004, after which a combination of monovalent and
bivalent vaccines were used.
The trivalent vaccine was withdrawn globally in 2016.
Classification National programmatic action
Description The program began conducting acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance in 1995. As part of the AFP surveillance, AFP cases
in children aged less than 15 years were reported to surveillance bodies and further investigated as possible polio cases
Classification National programmatic action
Description

AFP surveillance was fully functional by 1998, after provincial staff were provided training and computerized case listings
were introduced.
Classification National programmatic action
Description To ensure comprehensive coverage of border regions and children in transit, immunization activities in Pakistan and
Afghanistan were synchronized.
Classification National programmatic action
Description

The STOP program is a collaborative program run by the CDC, WHO, and UNICEF. In 1999, the Stop Transmission of Polio
(STOP) program was launched; international health professionals were sent to Pakistan on 3 to 5 months assignments to
assist with polio eradication activities and improve the quality of surveillance activities.
Classification National programmatic action
Description During the implementation of the 1998-1999 subnational immunization days (SNIDs) in Pakistan, a house-to-house
vaccination approach was introduced. The house-to–house vaccination approach was expanded further in 2000, and
became a core aspect of Pakistan’s polio eradication strategy.
Classification National programmatic action
Description

Classification
Description

Classification
Description

Classification
Second ‘Partnership Description
for Polio
Eradication’
project (20062008)
Classification
Finger-marking in
Description
polio campaigns
(2008)
Classification

In 2003, the First Partnership for Polio Eradication project was implemented by the Government of Pakistan. [24] This
project was funded by the World Bank, and the objective of this project was to support the supply to the Government of
Pakistan (GoP) of 50% of the Oral Polio Vaccine (OPV) needed for Supplemental Immunization Activities during
2003–2005. Project funds were transferred to UNICEF, who was responsible for vaccine procurement and delivery, as per
an agreement between the Government of Pakistan and UNICEF. The project financed the procurement of 371 million
oral polio vaccines (OPV) for SIAs held between 2003 to 2006, and roughly 30 million children were immunized in each
round.
National programmatic action
In 2004, the National EPI Advisory Group (NEAG) developed the first National EPI policy, which was adopted by the former
Ministry of Health in 2005. The new EPI policy introduced new vaccines and technologies, and aligned its goals with
priorities set at the global and regional level. Specific to vaccinations, the policy introduced new strategies for
immunizations and vaccine preventable disease (VPD) surveillance.
National policy formation and modifications
Monovalent OPV (mOPV) was introduced in Pakistan in 2005 (mOPV1) and 2007 (mOPV3), and were used until the
introduction of bivalent OPV in 2010.
National programmatic action
In 2006, the Second Partnership for Polio Eradication project was implemented by the Government of Pakistan, an
extension of the initial project implemented in 2003. The second project was also financed by the World Bank, and
vaccine procurement and delivery was also handled by UNICEF. The second project financed the procurement of
approximately 590 million doses of OPV to children between 2006 to 2008. Approximately 30 million children were
immunized in each round of SIAs.
National programmatic action
Finger-marking was introduced into polio campaigns in 2008 to objectively measure polio quality. This measure was
intended to complement parental recall and other methods used to identify previously vaccinated children.
National programmatic action
(Continued )
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Table 1. (Continued).
Policies/Programs/Strategies/Plans
Inter-Provincial
Description In 2009, the Federal Ministry of Health established the Inter-Provincial Committee for Polio (IPCP), which was chaired by the
Committee for
Federal Minister of Health. The ICPC was responsible for managing inter–sectoral coordination, monitoring the
Polio (IPCP)
engagement of officials working at district and union council levels, and bringing together all provincial health ministers
(2009)
in order to collectively address challenges experienced when implementing polio eradication strategies.
Classification Federal alliance
EPI Policy revised to Description In 2009, the EPI policy was revised and provided guidelines highlighting greater involvement of lady health workers (LHWs)
involve LHWs
in immunization programs. The revised EPI policy specified that LHWs who are trained in EPI will deliver vaccination
(2009)
services, and LHWs who are not trained in EPI will assist the vaccinator by organizing vaccination services and mobilizing
community members.
Classification National policy formation and modifications
Third ‘Partnership
Description In 2009, the third ‘Partnership for Polio Eradication’ project was implemented by the Government of Pakistan, the final
for Polio
extension of the initial project implemented in 2003. The third project was also financed by the World Bank, and UNICEF
Eradication’
continued to be responsible for vaccine procurement and delivery. The third project ensured timely supply and
project
procurement of OPV for polio campaigns conducted between 2009-2014, and approximately 32 million children were
(2009–2014)
immunized in each round of SIAs.
Classification National programmatic action
Environmental
Description Surveillance activities were expanded in 2009, when environmental surveillance was implemented. Sewage testing began
surveillance
in Lahore and Karachi, and enabled virus transmission to be monitored so that poliovirus reservoirs could be identified.
(2009)
Classification National programmatic action
Bivalent OPV
Description Bivalent OPV (bOPV) containing wild polioviruses 1 and 3 was introduced in 2010. bOPV replaced tOPV in 2016, and
(2010–present)
continues to be used today,
Classification National programmatic action
Decentralization of Description The passing of the 18th Amendment to the Constitution by the National Assembly of Pakistan in 2010 resulted in the
Pakistan’s health
decentralization of Pakistan’s federal health care system. As a consequence, the Federal Ministry of Health was devolved,
care system
and health care responsibilities were transferred from federal to provincial authorities.
(2010)
Classification National policy formation and modifications
National Emergency Description The National Emergency Action Plan (NEAP) was developed and launched in 2011. After limited success of the NEAP 2011,
Action Plan
and Augmented NEAP was launched in 2012, with the goal of stopping poliovirus transmission by the end of 2012. The
(NEAP) (2011goal of ending transmission was not achieved, thus followed the implementation of a yearly NEAP in 2013. This is an
2020)
annual strategic plan which has been released every year to date, and outlines the program’s eradication strategy,
priorities, and innovations. The NEAP includes coordination with and support from GPEI partners.
Classification National programmatic action
PM’s Polio
Description The Prime Minister’s Polio Monitoring & Coordination Cell was established in 2011. The purpose of this new Cell was to
Monitoring &
monitor and coordinate polio-eradication activities nationwide. The specific duties of the Cell included the following: 1)
Coordination Cell
To liaise on a regular basis with the Provincial Monitoring Cells, Provincial health departments, National and Provincial
(2011)
EPI teams, Chief Secretaries office, DCOs, EDOs Health and other relevant departments and organizations to regularly
monitor the progress of the Polio Eradication Initiative and provide feedback to the Prime Minister. 2) To facilitate and
ensure the establishing of Polio Monitoring Cells at the Provincial level in line with announcement made by the Prime
Minister on 14 January 2011. 3) To provide guidance, technical input and situation analysis to the National Task Force on
Polio Eradication led by the Prime Minister.
Classification Federal alliance
National Task Force Description The President of Pakistan declared polio eradication a national emergency, and established the National Task Force on
on Polio
Polio Eradication in 2012. The Task Force was to be chaired by the Prime Minister, and constituted of provincial chief
Eradication
ministers and chief secretaries.
(2012)
Classification Federal alliance
National Vaccine
Description In 2012, a National Vaccine Management Committee (NVMC) was established at the federal level, with representation from
Management
EPI, WHO, and UNICEF. The Committee was responsible for supporting vaccine management and reporting, including
Committee
vaccine storage, transport, and utilization. The Committee was developed in response to the recommendations made by
(NVMC) (2012)
UNICEF, after they conducted a vaccine management review which highlighted issues with vaccine storage and wastage,
and cold chain maintenance.
Classification Federal alliance
Revision of security Description After a series of attacks on polio workers and vaccination campaigns in 2012, the program adapted and began to operate
operations (2012)
under a new security framework, with intensified security operations in place for frontline health workers.
Classification National programmatic action
Section 144 of the Description Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code was invoked for the first time during a polio campaign in Pakistan in 2012, by
Criminal
the District Coordination Officer (DCO) of Faisalabad. Section 144 was implemented to counteract vaccine refusals, and
Procedure Code
made it a criminal offense for parents to refuse vaccinating their children during polio campaigns. Furthermore, under
invoked (2012)
Section 188 of the Pakistan Penal Code, action could be taken against parents who refused to let health teams vaccinate
their children against polio during the anti-polio campaigns. According to press releases, this seems to be the first time
that the law held non-compliant caregivers accountable, however Section 144 was also implemented in other cities such
as Peshawar (2014), Charsadda (2015), and Mardan (2020).
Classification National policy formation and modifications
Polio
Description The polio communication approach saw a shift in 2013; with support from UNICEF, the Government of Pakistan began to
communication
emphasize polio vaccination as an Islamic responsibility.
approach shifted Classification National programmatic action
as an Islamic
responsibility
(2013)
Fatwa issued urging Description A prominent Pakistani religious scholar, Maulana Sami Ul Haq, issued a Fatwa (Islamic ruling) urging parents to immunize
parents to
their children against poliovirus.
immunize their
Classification National programmatic action
children (2013)
(Continued )
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Table 1. (Continued).
Policies/Programs/Strategies/Plans
Emergency
Description
Operations
Center (EOC)
(2014)
Classification
International Ulama Description
Conference on
Polio Eradication
(2014)
Classification
Revision of National Description
EPI Policy (2015)

The Government of Pakistan launched the Emergency Operations Centers (EOC), at both the federal and provincial levels.
These centers were to be supported by Polio Eradication Committees at the district and union-council levels, and were
responsible for timely monitoring of activities, and responding to the needs of local areas in a prompt and effective
manner.
Federal alliance
The International Ulama Conference on Polio Eradication was held in 2014, and had representation from Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, and other Islamic nations. At this conference, the Ulama of Pakistan issued a Fatwa declaring the use of
polio vaccine completely permissible under Islamic Sharia, and they also reassured the community that the polio vaccine
does not contain any harmful ingredients, further endorsing its use.
National programmatic action
The revised EPI policy was released in 2015, and outlined the following objectives: 1) To affirm the commitment of the
Government of Pakistan (GOP) to provide safe, effective and cost-effective vaccination against Vaccine Preventable
Diseases (VPDs). 2) To set national standards and guidelines for immunization aligned with the global goals and
evidence base, and encourage the program for generation of local evidence for vaccination against VPDs.
Classification National policy formation and modifications
IPV introduced into Description According to the revised national EPI policy, one dose of IPV was introduced into the routine immunization schedule.
the national EPI Classification National policy formation and modifications
(2015)
Revision of security Description Ongoing attacks against polio workers led to the revision of the program’s security plan in 2015. Minister for National
plans to include
Health Services Saira Afzal Tarar chaired an emergency high level polio security meeting, which was attended by
armed forces
representative of Armed Forces, Ministry of Interior. Secretary, and Ministry of National Health Services. The outcomes of
(2015)
this meeting were as following: 1) A post incident inquiry be conducted in the event of any polio–related attack. These
inquires will be conducted by a team consisting of a Ministry of Interior representative, an official from the intelligence
agencies, a District Police Officer representative, and an expert representing the polio program. This inquiry should
determine the case, fix responsibilities if a lapse in security arrangements was identified, and make recommendations to
avoid recurrence of such events. 2) Provinces will be allowed to seek help from civil armed forces or armed forces to
ensure security cordoning of campaign areas.
Classification National policy formation and modifications
National
Description In 2016, the National Immunization Support Program (NISP) was implemented, with the goal of providing the Government
Immunization
of Pakistan with additional funding to strengthen the national EPI program. The NISP has the following objectives: 1)
Support Project
Increase the equitable coverage of services for immunization against vaccine preventable diseases (VPD), including
(NISP) (2016)
poliomyelitis, for children between 0 and 23 months in Pakistan, 2) Improve immunization services through
strengthening Routine Immunization and introduce Systems Strengthening approach, 3) Interruption of transmission of
indigenous wild Poliovirus by the end of 2015 and certification of a Polio Free Pakistan by the end of 2018.
Classification National programmatic action
Polio Endgame
Description The GPEI launched the Polio Endgame Strategy 2019-2023 in 2019. The Endgame Strategy outlines the strategic plan for
Strategy
eradicating polio globally, with a particular focus on the polio-endemic countries. The plan highlights that complete
2019–2023
polio eradication will require prompt detection and interruption of polio transmission, strong immunizations systems
(2019)
and integration of polio surveillance with other VPD surveillance systems, and the ultimate containment of all
polioviruses.
Classification National programmatic action
PROVINCIAL
‘Sehat ka Insaf’
(health justice)
campaign –
Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa
(2014)
‘Sehat Ka Ittehad’
(health unity)
program –
Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa
(2015)
Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa
Immunization
Support Project
(2015)

Description

The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) political party launched the ‘Sehat ka Insaf’ campaign in Khyber Pakthunkhwa in 2014,
with the goal of protecting children against nine vaccine-preventable diseases, including polio. The campaign was
initially launched in Peshawar and reached approximately 30,000 families, costing the PTI government roughly 20 billion
rupees.
Classification Provincial action
Description

The ‘Sehat Ka Ittehad’ program was launched in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2015. The ‘Sehat Ka Ittehad’ program was aimed
at providing polio vaccination, and vaccinations against other diseases such as measles and diarrhea, to children in FATA
and other regions of Khyber Pakthunkhwa, who had not been vaccinated due to inaccessibility or security reasons.
Classification Provincial action
Description

The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Immunization Support Project (KPISP) was launched in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2015. KPISP was
aimed at providing additional funding to support the province’s existing EPI program, and increasing coverage of VPD,
including polio, among children.
Classification Provincial action

3.1.1. 1994 – 2001: Early days of polio eradication
The Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI) was launched in
Pakistan in 1978 and included immunization against several
diseases including polio. However, through support from the
GPEI, the Pakistan Polio Eradication Programme was launched as
an independent program in 1994 [2,3,70]. The initiation of polio
eradication efforts was signified by the first set of supplementary
immunization activities (SIAs) through National Immunization
Days (NIDs) [71]. In 1995, the program began conducting
acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance, and AFP surveillance

was fully functional by 1998 [14,72,73]. The last case of wild
poliovirus type 2 (WPV2) in Pakistan was reported in 1997 [74].
This positive milestone so early in the program supported the
belief that polio eradication in Pakistan was possible.
Starting in 1998, immunization activities in Pakistan and
Afghanistan were planned in synchronization to ensure border
regions and children in transit were covered comprehensively
[14]. In 1999, the Stop Transmission of Polio (STOP) program
was launched, which deployed international health profes
sionals to Pakistan to assist with polio eradication and
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surveillance activities [14]. Between 1998 and 1999, Pakistan
implemented subnational immunization days (SNIDs) which
introduced the use of a house-to-house vaccination strat
egy [14].
The start of the new millennium was marked by the
September 11 attacks against the United States (US), which
led to the US invading Afghanistan [75]. The start of this war
increased insecurity and conflict in Afghanistan and bordering
regions of Pakistan, and posed a threat to polio workers’
safety. Displacement and the disruption of Afghanistan’s sur
veillance system limited polio eradication efforts [76]. In an
effort to address terrorism in Pakistan, drone strikes began in
the newly merged districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (known at
that time as the Federally Administered Tribal Area), which
intensified the belief that vaccination programs had an under
lying ulterior motive [77].

3.1.2. 2003 – 2006: First partnership for polio eradication
In 2003, the First Partnership for Polio Eradication project was
implemented by the Government of Pakistan [57]. This project
was funded by the World Bank, and financed the procurement
of 371 million oral polio vaccines (OPV) for SIAs between 2003
and 2006 [57]. In 2005, the Government of Pakistan adopted
its’ first national EPI policy, which introduced new strategies
for immunizations and VPD surveillance which would be rele
vant to polio [70]. In October 2005, the Kashmir Earthquake
struck; this environmental disaster impacted the delivery of
polio vaccination campaigns in affected regions, and more
than 50 medical officers from the polio eradication program
were critical first responders to the earthquake [78].

3.1.3. 2006-2008: Second partnership for polio eradication
In 2006, the Second Partnership for Polio Eradication project
was implemented by the Government of Pakistan and
financed by the World Bank [58]. As an extension to the initial
project implemented in 2003, the second project financed the
procurement of approximately 590 million doses of OPV for
SIAs held between 2006 and 2008 [58]. In 2008, finger–mark
ing was introduced in to polio campaigns to objectively mea
sure the quality and reach of campaigns [79].

3.1.4. 2009 – 2012: Third partnership for polio eradication
In 2009, the third, and final, Partnership for Polio Eradication
project was implemented [59]. The third project, also financed
by the World Bank, ensured timely supply and procurement of
OPV for polio campaigns conducted between 2009-2014 [59].
In 2009, an Inter-Provincial Committee for Polio (IPCP) was
established by the Federal Ministry of Health [80,81]. The
ICPC was chaired by the Federal Minister of Health, and
brought together health officials working at the provincial
district, and union council level [80,81]. The existing EPI policy
was revised in 2009, and provided guidelines which promoted
greater involvement of lady health workers (LHWs) in immu
nization delivery [70]. These adjustments hoped to leverage
the already established cadre of workers embedded in com
munities. Polio surveillance activities in Pakistan were
expanded in 2009, through the pilot implementation of envir
onmental surveillance [80].

Pakistan’s federal health-care system was decentralized in
2010, after the passing of the 18th Amendment to the
Constitution [82]. The devolution of health care to
provinces resulted in staffing shortages in the EPI, and issues
related to the quality, supply, storage and management of
GPEI vaccines by provinces [68]. During the 2010 monsoon
season, devastating floods ravaged the country and affected
the lives of millions of people [83]. The risk of poliovirus
transmission was heightened as the monsoon floods resulted
in a large displacement of populations, damaged health
infrastructure, and lack of access to water and sanitation
supplies, particularly in the hardest–hit regions of Central
Pakistan [83].
In 2011, the GPEI Emergency Action Plan 2012-2013 was
developed for Pakistan, Nigeria and Afghanistan (the remain
ing polio–endemic countries) [84]. The plan builds upon the
GPEI Strategic Plan 2010-2012, and was aimed at getting the
GPEI back on track to reach it milestones through an emer
gency approach [84].
With increasing polio case rates in Pakistan, the 2011
National Emergency Action Plan (NEAP) was created [85]. At
the federal level, 2011 also saw the establishment of the Prime
Minister’s Polio Monitoring & Coordination Cell [85]. By work
ing in close liaison with health agencies at every level, the Cell
aimed to improve oversight and coordination of polioeradication activities nationwide [86]. The politicization of
the polio program was heightened in 2011, when Osama Bin
Laden was killed in Abbottabad [87]. Osama Bin Laden was
located through a fake hepatitis vaccine program conducted
by the American CIA, in collaboration with a local Pakistani
physician [87]. This incident deepened community mistrust
toward vaccine programs, including polio vaccination pro
grams, and, for many, confirmed their belief that polio eradi
cation campaigns were a ploy by the CIA [88].
2012 was characterized by a series of positive and negative
events. On the positive side, the last case of wild poliovirus
type 3 (WPV3) in Pakistan was reported in 2012, signifying the
eradication of two types of wild polioviruses [86]. In addition,
negotiation efforts led to roughly 30,000 children living in
Tirah Valley, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, being vaccinated for the
first time in three years [89]. Children in Tirah Valley had not
received polio vaccinations since September 2009 due to
insecurity which made certain parts of the region inaccessible
to polio teams [90]. At the same time, the opposite situation
was unfolding in North and South Waziristan in Federally
Administered Tribal Area FATA, where local leaders issued
a complete ban on immunization campaigns [89]. The ban
was imposed in July 2012 and continued in to 2013, making
roughly 200,000 children at high risk of contracting polio as
they could not be accessed by vaccination teams [89]. The ban
was initiated by Hafiz Gul Bahadur who stated that vaccina
tions would be halted until the drone strikes stopped [91].
That year also marked the beginning of a series of violent
attacks against polio workers across Pakistan, beginning in
July 2012 and continuing today [89,92]. The victims of these
attacks include frontline workers, international consultants/
staff, program staff, and even policemen providing security
[89]. In light of the 2012 attacks, the program’s security was
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revised, and the program began to operate under a new
security framework [89].
In response to increasing case rates and brewing vaccine
hesitancy, 2012 saw the establishment of various new initia
tives. The President of Pakistan declared polio eradication
a national emergency, and established the National Task
Force on Polio Eradication [86]. The 2011 NEAP, which had
been implemented with limited success, was revised to create
the 2012 Augmented NEAP [60]. The National Stop
Transmission of Polio (N-STOP) program, which consisted of
local and international partners, was implemented in Pakistan
[89]. Amidst critique of vaccine storage and wastage, and cold
chain maintenance, the National Vaccine Management
Committee (NVMC) was also established [68,93]. The NVMC
included representation from EPI, WHO, and UNICEF [68]
Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code was invoked
for the first time in the context of polio eradication in Pakistan,
by the District Coordination Officer (DCO) of Faisalabad in
2012 (according to press releases) [94]. Section 144 was
imposed in the district, and under Section 188 of the
Pakistan Penal Code, action could be taken against parents
who refused to let health teams vaccinate their children dur
ing polio vaccination campaigns [94]. Despite this being the
first time that the law held non-compliant caregivers accoun
table, Section 144 has since been implemented in other cities
such as Peshawar (2014), Charsadda (2015), and Mardan (2020)
[95–97].

3.1.5. 2013 – present: yearly national emergency action
plans (NEAP)
As the partnerships for polio eradication wrapped up in 2014,
and with limited success of NEAP 2011 and 2012, the imple
mentation of a yearly NEAP began [60]. The NEAP is a yearly
plan that outline the program’s eradication strategy, priorities,
and innovations [98]. In 2013, in response to growing religious
opposition to polio vaccination, the polio communication
strategy began to emphasize polio vaccination as an Islamic
responsibility [99]. That same year, a prominent Pakistani reli
gious scholar issued a Fatwa (Islamic ruling) urging parents to
immunize their children against poliovirus [100]. Religious
advocacy remained a priority in 2014, with the Ulema (promi
nent Muslim scholars) of Pakistan issuing a Fatwa declaring
the use of polio vaccine completely permissible under Islamic
Sharia [101,102].
In 2014, the Government of Pakistan launched the
Emergency Operations Centers (EOC), at both the federal and
provincial levels [64,103]. This decision was in response to the
disjointed management of the polio eradication activities,
EOCs created a centralized hub and a strong platform for the
program [64,103]. Despite these coordination efforts, many
coordination and management issues continued to per
sist [61].
Sehat ka Insaf (justice for health) campaign was launched in
Khyber Pakthunkhwa in 2014, with the goal of protecting
children against nine vaccine-preventable diseases, including
polio [104]. Other positive developments in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa included the resumption of polio campaigns in
Bara, after five years of inaccessibility [103].
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Two other health programs were launched in Khyber
Pakthunkhwa in 2015; the Sehat Ka Ittehad (unity for health)
program and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Immunization Support
Project (KPISP) [105,106]. The Sehat Ka Ittehad program was
aimed at providing vaccinations against diseases, including
polio and measles, to children in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, who
had not been vaccinated due to inaccessibility or security
reasons [106,107]. KPISP was aimed at providing additional
funding to support the province’s existing EPI program, and
increasing coverage of vaccines for VPD, including polio,
among children [105]. Peshawar has previously been declared
the ‘world’s largest reservoir’ of poliovirus by the World Health
Organization, which had concerned local authorities as it is the
main urban center of northwest Pakistan [108]. The mass
movement of populations through Peshawar, coupled with
insecurity and rumors about the polio vaccine poses contin
ued threats to polio eradication, thus in 2014 the WHO called
for immediate action to boost vaccination among children
residing in Peshawar [108]. In response to misconceptions
about vaccines being incompatible with the Islamic Shariah
Law, the Islamic Advisory Group (IAG) adopted a new antipolio action plan which incorporated advocacy and commu
nication activities in 2015 [109]. The national EPI policy was
revised in 2015; additionally, one dose of IPV was introduced
in to the routine immunization schedule [70]. In light of
ongoing attacks against polio workers, the security plan for
polio workers was revised in 2015, and included the program’s
utilization of civil armed forces for heightened security protec
tion [110].
In 2016, the National Immunization Support Program (NISP)
was implemented, which provided the Government of
Pakistan with additional funding to strengthen the national
EPI program [111,112]. Between 2016 and 2019, a series of
partnerships were formed between the polio program and
public and private organizations such as Zong (mobile net
work operator company), K-Electric (energy company), CocaCola Pakistan and Survey of Pakistan (public government
agency) to support program efforts [85,113,114]. Similarly,
program partnerships with celebrities, such as Wasim Akram
and Shahid Afridi (well–known cricketers), have been used to
promote and highlight the importance of polio [115]. In 2019,
with only two polio endemic countries remaining, the GPEI
launched the Polio Endgame Strategy 2019–2023 [69]. This
strategy outlines the plan for eradicating polio globally, and
focuses on strategies which need to be implemented in
Pakistan and Afghanistan [69].

3.2. Barriers and facilitators
The following sections will outline the barriers and facilitators
to the delivery and uptake of polio vaccination. These factors
have been divided into sections that focus on the beliefs and
experiences of caregivers, the Pakistani Polio program, and
threats to Pakistan’s polio eradication activities.

3.2.1. Caregiver beliefs, knowledge, and experiences
Caregiver’s beliefs and knowledge about polio vaccination
were identified by our literature review as an important barrier
and facilitator to polio vaccination. Several articles cited
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misbeliefs and misperceptions about polio vaccination as
a barrier to increasing vaccination rates. The beliefs were of
two different types; demographic, geopolitical, and religious
concerns, and misbeliefs about when a child could be vacci
nated [26,27,31–33,36,38–42,44,49,53,54,56,65]. Misbeliefs
about when a child could be vaccinated were less common,
and included caregivers who believed that they could not
vaccinate their child if the child was unwell [33,42]. Fear of
side effects was highlighted by multiple studies as one of the
key
reasons
for
refusing
vaccination
[25,30–
,30–32,35,36,41,42,45,47,48,52,54]. The majority of these stu
dies did not describe specifically the type or nature of side
effects that caregivers feared.
Demographic, geopolitical, and religious concerns, which
were more commonly cited in the literature, were often char
acterized in the literature as rumors about polio vaccination.
Demographic concerns were focused on the potential fertility
impacts of the polio vaccine on increasing sterility
[27,31,35,36,38–41,44,47–49]. Closely related to demographic
concerns were geopolitical anxieties about the true motive
underlying the vaccine [26,40,44,49]. Several studies described
community fears that the polio campaign was part of a US,
specifically CIA, agenda [40], while others highlighted commu
nity concerns about the involvement of foreign NGOs [44]. At
the core of geopolitical anxieties were demographic concerns
about shrinking the Muslim population as part of a foreign
agenda [49]. Questions about the religious permissibility of the
polio vaccine were also common [27,31,32,36,38–
32,36,38–41,44,49,53,54,56,65]. In some contexts, these under
standings were related to the belief that haram
(impermissible) ingredients such as pig by–products were
used in the polio vaccine [40,44,49].
Limited knowledge of immunization schedules and the
need for multiple polio vaccinations was highlighted by sev
eral studies as leading to incomplete polio vaccination
[32,33,42,45,52,54]. Conversely, caregiver’s awareness of the
benefits of polio vaccination for their children was a strong
facilitator of vaccination [32,35,42,47,48,56].
The type of information caregivers received, and the source
was also cited as an essential factor to polio vaccination.
Tailored messages specific to the needs of the local commu
nity were described as an important strategy to encourage
polio vaccination [46]. However, exposure to messaging about
the benefits of polio vaccination is not sufficient, as several
studies highlighted community members who did not trust
the messaging about the vaccines effectiveness, utility, or
necessity [25,27,41,42,45,47,48,54]. Trust in government insti
tutions and foreign agencies involved in polio campaigns
affected receptivity to vaccination. Repeated polio campaigns
had contributed to community fatigue and fostered vaccine
hesitancy [27,50,66]. Frustrations with the lack of essential
services such as poor water and sanitation also fostered mis
trust in the Pakistani government and contributed to polio
vaccine refusal [26,66]. Conversely, the literature highlighted
how positive experiences through community outreach activ
ities facilitated polio vaccinations [32,63,64]. The importance
of communication strategies such as Sehat Muhafiz (health
security) was highlighted by one study as shifting beliefs
about polio activities and healthcare workers [63]. Several

documents highlighted how trust in the healthcare workers
delivering vaccination could also foster trust and acceptance
of the services provided by these workers, particularly polio
vaccines [32,64,65]. A few studies highlighted how caregivers
only partially or entirely refused vaccinating their children
because they had experienced negative treatment by health
care workers [42,54].

3.2.2. Polio program: governance and oversight
Governance and oversight of the polio program experienced
significant challenges that hindered program delivery. Staff
morale and job satisfaction was highlighted as an issue in
polio eradication efforts. Several studies highlighted com
plaints among polio workers related to insufficient remunera
tion [26,43,46–48] and inefficient and delayed payment
mechanisms [26,50,65]. Several studies argued that low pay
with limited incentives such as promotions and raises
[26,43,46] coupled with intense pressure and job insecurity
of temporary posts had led to exhaustion and dissatisfaction
[26,46]. Attacks on healthcare workers and increased insecurity
exacerbated their dissatisfaction with their job [26].
Transportation was also an issue for many vaccinators
[32,43,47,67]. Although they were expected to reach areas
that were far off, they did not have access to vehicles
[47,48], or at times funds for fuel or vehicle repairs [67]; thus,
many of these far-flung areas remained unvaccinated [43].
Critiques persisted about the poor selection and training of
polio workers [50,62,63]. The hiring of locals as healthcare work
ers has proven to be a successful strategy as it allows the
leveraging of local knowledge, related to the local context and
the specific households of missed children, both of which are
key to eradication [60,65]. However, nepotism often played
a role in how polio workers were identified. Insufficient training
of vaccinators and other health workers [29,32] resulted in
issues with both their technical skills [32,45,46] and their knowl
edge about the virus [32,46]. Limited training and knowledge of
polio has been seen to be a particular concern with LHWs [37].
Concerns related to the training of vaccinators have also been
highlighted by caregivers and community members. One study
also highlighted how caregivers themselves were unsatisfied
with the training of vaccinators who they saw as not providing
sufficient instructions on how to position a child’s head during
vaccination [32]. The need for further training also extended to
management, with managers not having the requisite skills
related to resource allocation and HR management [46].
Limited preparation and accountability were best evi
denced during campaigns. Pre-campaign trainings have been
critiqued for being ineffective and having low engagement
from staff, particularly area-in-charge (AIC) and medical offi
cers [50]. Preparation meetings were not conducted, even
though they were reported as having been completed. Many
of the trainings that did occur were seen as formalities [50].
During campaigns, vaccinator absences were also a key issue
[42,45,67]. Ineffective use of teams to wrong areas, or for
insufficient periods was also an issue [50]. AICs are tasked
with monitoring the field activities of vaccinators, however,
many of them do not provide this feedback [50]. Vaccine
ledgers and tally sheets were also highlighted as having errors
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[68] Many vaccinators doubted that they would be held
accountable for their performance [26,50]. Microplans were
also not utilized to their best of their ability. Although these
documents were developed, they were not used effectively
during campaign preparation and many of these had signifi
cant gaps [50,63,64]. Moreover, many implementing partners
did not enforce the use of microplans during campaign activ
ities [50]. Field monitoring systems are an area which requires
concerted improvement [50].
Reliable surveillance systems are also key to polio eradication
strategy and planning [57]. Some of these probable surveillance
gaps have been highlighted as contributing to outbreaks such
as the cVDPV2 outbreak in Jaffarabad and Mastung Districts.
Better integration between AFP, VPD, disease early warning
system (DEWS), and health management information systems
(HMIS) reporting systems would allow more sensitive monitor
ing of field activities [50]. The current AFP surveillance systems
have been critiqued for its limited sensitivity to capture the
circulation of polio virus [50,62]. Efforts to improve the sensitiv
ity of the AFP surveillance system have however been imple
mented in the past. In 2004, the collection of stool samples was
expanded to include the direct contacts of AFP patients for
whom stool-specimen collection, storage, or shipment, to the
laboratory was inadequate or questionable [116]. Between 2000
and 2004, the non-polio–associated AFP rate (NFAFP) increased
from 1.53 to 3.53 cases per 100,000, and the percentage of AFP
cases for which adequate stool specimens were collected
increased from 71% to 88% (Figure 4). Targeted surveys have
led to accurate assessments of missed populations, particularly
HRMP, and development of focused vaccination strategies
[63,65].
A lack of adherence to and enforcement of protocols
related to vaccine supply and storage were also highlighted.
Many studies described concerns related to cold chain main
tenance [28,29,34,41,45–48,58,67,68] due to noncompliance

[45,58], maintenance of cooling units [45,46,67,68], and loadshedding [46–48]. Insufficient vaccine supplies and delays in
receiving vaccines hindered the effectiveness of polio eradica
tion activities [29,32,33,35,68].
Government ownership of polio eradication through pro
viding sustained oversight to activities and establishing strong
partnerships with donors and experts is an important aspect
of polio eradication activities [58,60,61,63,64]. However, coor
dination between different levels of government including
central, provincial and district managers is limited and incon
sistent [29,46].
The 18th amendment and devolution of powers is believed
to have contributed to the confusion of responsibilities at
different levels of government [46]. Leadership transitions
and political interference have exacerbated the effectiveness
of polio eradication activities [43,46,66]. In order to improve
coordination, EOCs and polio control rooms have been estab
lished as part of the NEAP to ensure oversight and account
ability of the NEAP [62,63]. Regular meetings between the
Prime Minister’s Polio Monitoring and Coordination Cell,
Chief secretaries, and other provincial and district level officials
have also been used as a strategy to improve engagement
and in turn, campaign effectiveness [60].
Integration of polio with broader health services has also
come to the forefront as an important strategy to facilitate
polio vaccination [28,63]. As the 2018-2019 NEAP highlighted
multi-level, interdisciplinary, and multi–agency collaboration is
an important strategy to support polio eradication [65]. Polio
activities, such as SIA, have been critiqued for being disjointed
from routine EPI services [50]. Moreover, there is still
a pressing need for engagement with other preventive health
programs [46], supportive government agencies [66], and the
private sector [43].
Structural issues related to health infrastructure develop
ment were an obstacle for parents seeking routine
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immunization services. Physical proximity and access to health
facility was highlighted as a key facilitator of polio vaccination
[40,42]. Families that live far away from EPI centers often cited
that this was one of their reasons for refusing immunization
[25,30,31,35,36,42,45,47,48,52,54,67]. Constraints to caregivers
time and schedules also acted as a barrier to vaccinating their
children [25,28,30,32,35,42,45,47,48,54].

3.2.3. Pakistani context: climate and insecurity threats
Pakistan faces significant challenges related to environmental
factors and insecurity. Climate shocks such as the floods in
2010 have proved to be a challenge for polio vaccination as
displaced populations moved into crowded and unsanitary
temporary living situations where polio spread easily [59].
Pakistan’s high population density and warm climate are also
conditions conducive to the spread of polio [30].
Insecurity and terrorism have been a persistent barrier to
polio eradication efforts [26–29,36,39,40,47,48,50,54,55,58,
59,61,67]. Vaccination bans, such as those in North and
South Waziristan in 2012, limited access to pockets of popula
tions [59]. While attacks on healthcare workers have cultivated
fear among healthcare workers. For instance, the targeted
killing of a healthcare worker in UC-4 Gadap Town Karachi
led to healthcare workers avoiding those areas [61]. Healthcare
workers frequently experienced verbal abuse when delivering
polio vaccinations [40,44]. At times, they also experienced
physical abuse, as one study described a health worker who
was hit in the face by a father angrily refusing polio vaccina
tion [26]. As discussed above, working in this difficult environ
ment had a negative impact on worker motivation [26].
Improvements in the security situation in Shangla and Swat,
and the subsequent increase of polio vaccination, demon
strate the role of insecurity in polio vaccination rate [36].

4. Conclusion
As our review has demonstrated, Pakistan’s failure to eradicate
polio cannot be traced to one underlying cause. Instead, it is
essential that one considers the web of factors that have
thwarted Pakistan’s polio eradication efforts [117]. Although
consistently present throughout the polio program, these fac
tors have emerged more strongly at different periods in
response to different conditions and events. Programs and
policies have attempted to respond to these concerns but at
times, these delays have also led to an increase in polio cases.
At its onset, Pakistan’s eradication efforts experienced sig
nificant success. Eradication of polio seemed feasible with case
rates of 1803 in 1994 falling to 28 cases in 2006 [118].
However, the optimism associated with the program soon
dwindled as the country started to experience steady
increases in polio cases. By 2008, there were a documented
118 cases of polio in Pakistan. The early success of the polio
program demonstrated that Pakistan had the technical capa
city to implement polio eradication efforts [119]. Yet, the
increase in polio cases in the 2000s indicated that there
were underlying issues with the polio vaccination activities.
Underlying increasing polio cases in the late 2000s was incon
sistent governance and limited oversight [120,121].The

creation and launch of the 2011 NEAP led to little progress
on the ground [120,121]. Dysfunctional governance including
fragmented responsibility and limited accountability contin
ued to drive polio cases [120,121]. As cases steadily increased
from 89 in 2009 to 198 in 2011, restrategization of polio
eradication plans became necessary [118]. Through the aug
mented 2012 NEAP, the polio eradication program was able to
improve management issues and increase accountability
[9,122].
However, as governance and management issues started to
improve in 2012, terrorism and insecurity increased across
Pakistan. Threats of violence against polio workers began to
increase, ultimately culminating in to violent attacks against
polio teams. In 2012, 22 polio workers were killed [122].
Security and access emerged as one of the most important
barriers to polio vaccinations. The increase of polio refusals
and propagation of rumors reflected fractured community
trust. Insufficient community-based strategies and unmet
needs in maternal and child health services only exacerbated
the situation. Pakistan’s increasing polio case count made it
the key obstacle to global polio eradication. In June 2014,
military intervention in Waziristan improved access to popula
tions where the majority of polio cases were concentrated
[123]. This includes improving vaccination among high-risk
mobile populations where there are often larger clusters of
cases [12]. Many of these individuals travel within Pakistan but
also cross the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan [124].
Initiatives such as all age vaccination points in Torkham Gate
(Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Friendship Gate (Balochistan), and
improved tracking and surveillance of polio in this group is an
important priority for government officials, although some of
these activities have been disrupted due to COVID-19 [66,125].
More recently, governance and oversight challenges have
again emerged as a key challenge for the polio program.
Political interference has hindered polio eradication activities
[15,16] Inconsistent leadership has only worsened after the
2018 elections. Leading into these elections, the international
community expressed concern that polio eradication activities
may be disrupted by any political transitions. Despite assur
ance that Senator Ayesha Raza Farooq, the Prime Minister’s
Focal Person for Polio Eradication, would continue in her
position to give continuity to program activities, she resigned
after the election [124]. The government did not announce
anyone to take her place, leaving the polio program with
a leadership vacuum for several months [124]. The subsequent
appointee, Babar Bin Atta, has since resigned and been
accused of corruption [126].

5. Expert opinion
5.1. Reframing resistance
Among the many reasons contributing to the failure of
Pakistan’s polio eradication effort, the Pakistan polio pro
gram has maintained a vertical strategy that narrowly
focuses on the eradication of one disease without support
ing primary health care or other preventive healthcare ser
vices [117]. Not only has the use of such a strategy diverted
attention and resources from key primary healthcare
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services, it has also played a role in cultivating suspicion of
polio vaccination. As our findings have demonstrated, com
munity concerns related to limited health infrastructure and
services played a role in the receptivity to polio vaccination.
Pakistan’s polio eradication activities, which are relatively
well funded, occur against the backdrop of an underfunded
and under-resourced health system [91,127]. The exorbitant
attention given to polio by the policymakers fuels skepti
cism of the true reasons underlying the program especially
with other health services being severely underfunded
[117]. As Closser and Coburn argue, for many children,
a polio visit is the only health service they obtain [91].
Repeated polio campaigns have only contributed to con
cerns about the agenda underlying polio campaigns and
resulted in community, and health worker, fatigue
[27,50,66,128]. As part of the GPEI Endgame strategy, the
government has committed to integrating EPI activities,
such as routine immunization, with polio vaccination [69].
Such a strategy will be essential to engaging communities
that are marginalized and disenfranchised [128]. Moreover,
the integration of polio activities within other preventive
health services may present an opportunity for the genera
tion of trust [129].
As our review has demonstrated, rumors and mistrust of
the polio vaccine are common in Pakistan. Situating this resis
tance to polio vaccination within its larger backdrop is essen
tial to understanding and shifting beliefs. Geopolitics, military
intervention, and ethnic tensions are key elements of the
landscape within which polio vaccination occurs. Most recent
estimates suggest that 26% of WPV cases in 2020 and 63% of
WPV cases in 2019 were in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa [2], with
cases in cities such as Karachi concentrated in areas populated
by Pakhtuns [19]. It is unsurprising that polio refusals have
been mainly from Pakhtun populations, many of whom live in
or are from geographies that have been the most affected by
drone attacks, foreign military intervention, and terrorism. The
belief of polio rumors has been closely linked to feelings of
marginalization and disenfranchisement [130]. Analysis of
polio resistance among Pakhtuns has illustrated that misper
ceptions and belief in rumors mirror larger political debates in
Pakistan [125]. Within the context of extended low-grade
conflict, community fears related to foreign involvement in
polio vaccine could be anticipated [91]. Emerging research
has demonstrated that military action such as drone attacks
further fragment community trust in polio activities [77,91]. In
fact, the 2012 vaccination ban in North and South Waziristan
was a direct response to these activities, and a desire for these
attacks to be halted [91]. The political nature of refusals to
polio asks us to reconsider some of our strategies to ensure
the uptake of polio vaccination. For instance, the use of sec
tion 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code and section 188 of
the Pakistan Penal Code to arrest refusal parents may deepen
distrust of the state and vaccination [130–132]. Also, the
involvement of security forces to assist with polio efforts
may confirm community’s fears that there is an ulterior motive
underlying these activities [133].
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The connection between disenfranchisement and polio is
perhaps best evident in the way that polio vaccination has
been used as a bargaining chip to obtain government services
[16]. This practice speaks to self-perceived powerlessness of
the community, and their belief that exploiting the govern
ment’s commitment to eradicate polio is the best strategy to
obtain a desired social service. It is clear that resistance to
polio vaccination often signals deeper inequities rooted in
underdevelopment, a lack of critical public health services,
disenfranchisement, and marginalization. Integrating polio
vaccination into comprehensive primary care services, as part
of a larger strategy to provide development and infrastructure
needs, is essential.

5.2. Research gaps and opportunities
The current literature on polio in Pakistan has been dominated
by a focus on user perspectives. This literature has primarily
focused on the beliefs and knowledge of caregivers. Literature
focusing on the perspectives of program workers, partner
organizations, and government representatives is limited.
The few studies that include these perspectives have still
focused on their perspectives on caregiver views of polio
vaccination. There is a key gap in our understanding of how
to improve coordination and collaboration between different
levels of government agencies and partner organizations.
Focused in-depth research in this area could generate key
recommendations for policymakers. Moreover, despite mis
trust of polio eradication efforts being cited in the literature
for over a decade, there is limited research on how this trust
can be cultivated by the polio program. Further research on
how to develop trust between communities, particularly
HRMP, and government agencies could have important
impacts on polio activities. One of the limitations of our
study is that we did not include serological research that
investigated the appropriateness of vaccine variants given
their differing efficacy on virus variants. Evidence from India
demonstrates that the success of their program was highly
contingent on responsive and modified approaches to distri
buting tOPV, bOPV, and mOPV to geographic hotspots during
different outbreaks [134]. In Pakistan, many of these policy
changes are relatively recent (see Figure 1); however, further
research is still needed to understand the role of these vaccine
transitions on polio eradication efforts.
There is also the opportunity to nuance our current under
standing of perceived barriers to polio vaccination. The focus
on the religious opposition to polio vaccination has been
reductive. Moreover, the current engagement of religious lea
ders to encourage polio vaccination has not been able to
entirely convince the public. Literature on Islam and health
practices has demonstrated that religious beliefs are consis
tently negotiated and contested [135,136]. The question
remains how then can that be leveraged to address vaccine
hesitancy in Pakistan. Understanding the nature of these
beliefs is essential to ensuring that policy and programmatic
activities fully address these concerns.
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Finally, the engagement of local partners in future research
is essential, particularly in areas of clinical research and disease
modeling. This is an understudied area, with the first study on
seroprevalence in Pakistan published in 2013 [137]. Moreover,
the genetic studies and disease modeling that has occurred has
been largely led by foreign institutions which obscure local
academic voices. It is essential that local experts with important
contextual details are funded and supported in these research
activities and centered in the academic discourse. Engagement
of local institutions must also include universities and academic
centers that are in the areas most affected by polio including
Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
The goal of global polio eradication is ambitious and
requires the buy-in from multiple stakeholders at different
levels of the health system. Pakistan has continuously fallen
behind on its milestones and optimism has begun to wane
[138]. If Pakistan is to make progress toward this goal in the
next five years, it will require concerted and targeted efforts.
As we have described, the Pakistan Polio Programme has
experienced large amounts of variability due to variable
governance, and weak management. Poor governance has
thwarted Pakistan’s polio eradication efforts [128]. Creating
systems of accountability to address corruption, and vari
able governance will be fundamental to its success.
Ensuring continuity after election cycles will ensure that
any progress made will not be undone. Moreover, as one
epidemiologic zone, eradication in Pakistan is contingent
upon eradication in Afghanistan and vice versa [15].
Improved collaboration toward the common goal of polio
eradication and cross-country learnings can help improve
vaccination uptake.
As the COVID-19 pandemic continues, it is unclear the
extent of the impacts it has had on polio vaccination rates.
The disruption of polio vaccination programs to control the
spread of COVID-19, continued social distancing, and supply
issues may have serious long-term impacts on the progress
made by the polio program [139]. Now, more than ever, it is
essential that Pakistan scale up its polio efforts to vaccinate
missed children during the disrupted vaccines campaigns.
Any gains made by the Pakistan polio program are precar
ious given the latent potential for polio outbreaks [117]. As
we have seen with incidents such as in Cairo, polio in
Pakistan is a risk to the efforts of other countries glob
ally [117].
Ultimately, for as long as EPI coverage continues to be low
and there is limited coordination between EPI and the polio
program, increasing polio vaccination rates will continue to be
a problem. As our review demonstrates, the current approach
of a vertical polio eradication strategy has limitations
[140,141]. Unless polio eradication is sufficiently integrated
into other health and preventive services including child
health, nutrition, and routine immunization, a vertical program
is likely to fail. Furthermore, if current polio eradication efforts
do not adequately address the community’s underlying con
cerns related to polio vaccination, there is little chance that
the eradication efforts will be unable to achieve their goal
[141]. Pakistan has the potential to make large gains toward
polio eradication in the next five years; however, this will

require consistent leadership and political support of the
program.
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Appendix I: Search strategy
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Pakistan.mp. or exp Pakistan/
Balochistan.mp.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.mp.
Punjab.mp.
Sindh.mp.
Azad Jammu and Kashmir.mp. [mp=title, abstract, original title,
name of substance word, subject heading word, floating subheading word, keyword heading word, organism supplementary
concept word, protocol supplementary concept word, rare disease
supplementary concept word, unique identifier, synonyms]
7. exp ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir’/
8. gilgit-baltistan.mp. or exp Gilgit-Baltistan/
9. Islamabad.mp.
10. 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 9
11. exp poliomyelitis vaccine/or exp poliomyelitis/or exp Poliomyelitis
virus/or exp oral poliomyelitis vaccine/
12. polio*.mp.
13. exp inactivated vaccine/or inactivated polio vaccine.mp.
14. eradicat*.mp.
15. eradication.mp. or exp disease eradication/
16. exp virus transmission/
17. exp communicable disease/
18. exp infection control/
19. exp disease transmission/

20. exp capacity building/
21. outreach.mp.
22. ‘integrated service delivery’.mp.
23. exp immunization/or exp mass immunization/
24. immuniz*.mp.
25. vaccin*.mp.
26. exp health program/
27. immunization program.mp.
28. ‘supplementary immunization’.mp.
29. exp disease surveillance/
30. surveillance.mp.
31. exp health program/
32. intervention.mp. or exp intervention study/
33. exp preventive health service/
34. advoca*.mp.
35. 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 or 15 or 16 or 17 or 18 or 19
36. 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 24 or 25 or 26 or 27 or 28 or 29 or 30 or 31
or 32 or 33 or 34
37. 10 and 35 and 36
38. limit 37 to english language and yr=‘2000 -Current’
39. campaign.mp.
40. program.mp.
41. 36 or 39 or 40
42. 10 and 35 and 41
43. limit 42 to english language and yr=‘2000 -Current’

